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ABSTRACT
Healthcare has been slow in using human factors
principles to reduce medical errors. The Center for
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) recognizes
that a lack of attention to human factors during
product development may lead to errors that have the
potential for patient injury, or even death. In response
to the need for reducing medication errors, the
National Coordinating Council for Medication Errors
Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) released the
NCC MERP taxonomy that provides a standard
language for reporting medication errors. This project
maps the NCC MERP taxonomy of medication error
to MedWatch medical errors involving infusion
pumps. Of particular interest are human factors
associated with medical device errors. The NCC
MERP taxonomy of medication errors is limited in
mapping information from MEDWATCH because of
the focus on the medical device and the format of
reporting.
INTRODUCTION
According to the Institute of Medicine, medical
errors rank as the eighth leading cause of death in the
United States.' Other high-risk industries such as
aviation and nuclear power plants have reduced
errors by applying human factors engineering - a
discipline that designs software, devices, systems,
and policies to increase worker efficiency and
decrease human errors. This reduction was possible,
in part, from the ability to collect, and share with
outsiders, data on errors and incidents that occur
within an organization. In contrast, healthcare has a
history of shame and blame for errors. Due to a
culture of secrecy and an indifference to safety,
healthcare lags behind in reporting and reducing
errors. Healthcare has been slow in using human
factors principles to reduce medical errors. The U.S.
Food and Drug Administration-Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (CDRH) recognizes that a
lack of attention to human factors during product
development may lead to errors that have the
potential for patient injury, or even death.2 Therefore,
it is critical to understand the underlying human
factors mechanisms that cause medical errors.
Equally important is understanding how a person's
work environment contributes to and even induces
those errors.
This research evaluates the utility of the NCC MERP
taxonomy of medication errors for coding human and
system factors from medical device error reports
received by the FDA involving infusion pumps and
attributed to user error. The primary research
question was how well the NCC MERP could capture
human and systems factors that contributed to user
error. A secondary question was to characterize the
kind of human and systems factors information
available in the FDA's databases. Because the FDA
data collection forms do not specifically ask for such
information and because an awareness of the
importance of such factors in healthcare appears low,
we expected to find very little.
Central to the development of medical error reporting
is a need for a controlled vocabulary and taxonomy.
In response to reducing medication errors, the
National Coordinating Council for Medication Errors
Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) released a
medication error taxonomy.3 Released in 1999, this
taxonomy provides a standard language and structure
of medication error-related data for use in developing
databases to analyze medication errors. The NCC
MERP taxonomy is available for download from the
World Wide Web. NCC MERP does not charge for
use of the taxonomy. Due to the newness of the
taxonomy, little research has been conducted to
evaluate its usefulness.
The NCC MERP medication error taxonomy is
organized into eight major categories:
1. patient information
2. medication error event
3. patient outcome
4. product information
5. personnel involved
6. type of medication error
7. causes
8. contributing factors
Each category has numerous attributes to be selected
or completed about the error. In Category 1, patient
demographic information is requested. Category 2 is
concerned with the specifics of the medication error
event. The description of the event is a free text entry
field. Category 3 requests information about the
patient's outcome. Information about the product that
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was actually or potentially given is classified in
Category 4. The personnel involved in the error are
classified under Category 5. In this category,
information about who made the initial error is
identified as well as who perpetuated the error. In
Category 6, the type of medication error is
categorized by such occurrences as dose omission,
improper dose, and wrong route of administration,
wrong rate, and monitoring. Category 7 identifies
communication, name confusion, labeling, and
human factors that contributed to the error.Although
human factors are known to contribute significantly
to medical errors, the role has not been well studied
in healthcare compared to other industries.4 This has
hindered both identification and understanding of
human factors in medical errors. The FDA recognizes
that individual performance is influenced by
knowledge about a device, cognitive abilities,
sensory capabilities, previous experience with
devices, size and strength, and coordination.
Environmental factors such as light, noise,
distraction, motion, and workload have an effect on
individual performance.5 Category 8, the contributing
factors, is important because it recognizes that the
healthcare environment can contribute to errors.
According to Leape et a16., a major breakthrough in
the study of errors was the recognition that system
factors influence the performance of an individual.
Successful techniques of error avoidance require
insight and awareness of potential error-causing
system defects. Flawed system design has two
outcomes: it causes user errors, and it makes them
difficult to detect in time to prevent the error. Within
healthcare, the usual response has been to focus on
the error and not the systemic cause. It is proposed
that correction of the system deficiencies will most
likely result in a reduction of errors.
The literature contains a number of reports on user
errors involving medical devices. In all cases, these
reports indicate that more problems are caused by
user error than device failure. For instance, one study
showed that 82% of all preventable medical errors
involving anesthesia devices was due to human
error.7 Other data suggests that patients may be 3 to
10 times more at risk due to user error than device
failure.8 One study of errors involving infusion
pumps found that the most frequent cause of patient
harm was user error and inadequate device
education.9 Bogner notes that human factors errors
are more likely to occur in the use of technologically
advanced devices such as programmable infusion
pumps and that remedial efforts often focus on users
when the real problems arise from faulty design. In
addition, Bogner states that "devices that are not
designed for ease of operation can be difficult to
operate safely and effectively, leading to errors.'0
To track medical device failures, the FDA maintains
publicly searchable databases for medical devices.
The Medical Device Reporting Program (MDR)
database contains reports on medical devices which
may have malfunctioned or caused death, or serious
injury from 1984 - to 1996." The Manufacturer and
User Facility Device Experience Database (MAUDE)
contains voluntary reports of adverse events
involving medical devices since June, 1993, user
facility reports since 1991, distributor reports since
1993, and manufacturer reports since August, 1996.12
FDA receives the medical error reports via the
MedWatch form from consumers and health
professionals. Clinicians and lay people are
encouraged to voluntarily report significant adverse
events with medical products. Healthcare
organizations are required to report suspected
medical device related deaths to both the FDA and
the manufacturers. All confidential information is
removed from the report before posting.
METHODS
Using search terms "volumetric infusion pump" and
"user error", the MAUDE was queried. The query
returned 73 reports from April 1992 thru December
31, 2001. The reports were coded and entered into an
Access® Database. Tables for the database were
constructed based on the categories in the NCC
MERP taxonomy with two exceptions. Two
additional tables were designed for human factors
and devices. This was done for ease of coding human
factors and device errors. This did not result in any
change to the original taxonomy. The Access®
database was analyzed for coding of information
given in the medical device error reports.
RESULTS
The query returned 73 reports for the terms
volumetric infusion pump and user error. Two reports
were determined to be duplicates and were discarded.
The remaining 71 reports were analyzed. Data were
coded from the 64 fields of the Medwatch form for
reporting medical errors to MAUDE. In Category 1
for patient information, no patient information was
reported. All patient identifiers are stripped before
making the information public. Identifying names of
healthcare organizations are not made available.
In Category 2 for medication event, only one report
had the actual date of the error. The MedWatch
report has the date that the manufacturer was notified
and the date that the FDA received notification. Five
reports included the time of the error. In 60 reports
(82.2%), the hospital was identified as the type of
healthcare facility. This information was found in the
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free text section. Thirteen reports (17.8%) provided
no information about the setting of the error. Three
reports specified the area of the hospital that the error
occurred such as the emergency room (ER) or an
intensive care unit (ICU). All reports had a free text
description of the error. The degree of detail varied
from a few words to an in-depth description.
In Category 3 for patient outcome, sixty reports
(82.2%) reported a patient outcome. In Category 4
for product information, the name of the medication
involved with the infusion pump error was identified
in twenty-eight records (38%). No additional product
information was reported.
In Category 5 for personnel involved, nurses were
identified as making the error in eight cases and
patient/caregiver in one incident. Five recorded who
perpetuated the error and nine logged who discovered
the error. In fifty-eight records, the device operator
was referred to as a health care professional. In three
records, the device operator was named as other
health care professional.
In Category 6 for the type of error, 64 reports were
recorded. Fifty-four records documented that the
infusion was delivered too fast. Another six records
indicated that infusions were delivered too slowly.
Four reports logged the wrong rate.
All reports selected for this project were attributed to
user error due to human factors. However, the reports
failed to state specific human factors that may have
led to the error. In our analysis, 36 records were
classified as performance deficits based on details of
the electronic logs in the free text of the MedWatch
report. The human factors issues leading to the
remaining user errors could not be coded in the NCC
MERP taxonomy, except as free text. All reports for
this project involved infusion pumps. While the
medical device error was attributed to user error,
thirty-eight records reported a possible device
malfunction; however, as indicated below only one
pump was found to be malfunctioning. One record
reported that systems factors contributed to the error
by a lack of training.
In reading the free text description of the event, we
noted the following:
* In one error more than one pump was involved
* In one error a multipurpose pump was involved
* Multi-channel pumps were involved in three
errors
* Problems with pump tubing led to four errors
* Administration of a secondary medication was
cited in four errors
* Problems with programming pumps were
reported in eleven errors
* Free flow of fluids contributed to four errors
* Eighteen electronic logs downloaded from the
infusion pump memory indicated problems with
programming the pump
* Sixty-one reports indicated that the pump was
either investigated, visually inspected, tested, or
evaluated by the manufacturer, the hospital
biomedical engineering department, or a third
party for malfunction but could not confirm the
malfunction and therefore attributed the problem
to user error
* One investigation determined an actual
malfunction of the infusion pump
* Two reports acknowledged pump design that
could contribute to user error
* 26 reports recommended additional training,
education, or reading the operating manual as an
intervention to reduce or prevent error
DISCUSSION
This study demonstrates the difficulty in coding
medical device errors with the NCCMERP taxonomy
of medication errors. An error involving an infusion
pump is both a device use error and a medication
error involving the use of a device. This type of event
requires a reporting form and taxonomy that will
handle complex medical errors.
Reporting of medical errors without understanding
the role of human factors in medical errors continues
to perpetuate unsafe healthcare. From the perspective
of cognitive science and human factors, medical
errors occur in large part due to inadequate
information processing in cognitive tasks., 3-15
However, the deficit in cognitive processing is often
due to poor device design and environmental factors
that induce people to make errors. In order to prevent
or greatly reduce medical errors it is critical to
understand the underlying cognitive mechanisms that
cause medical errors and how a person's work
environment (physical, social, cultural, & cognitive)
contributes to and even induces those errors.
The MedWatch is highly structured for reporting
medical device errors. This is important for
identifying potentially unsafe medical devices in use.
However, the form asks no information about human
factors. The free text section and the electronic log
from the infusion pumps provide limited information
about possible contributing human factors.
Completing the free text section to record user error
requires that the reporter know and understand how
human and systems factors contribute to medical
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errors. Research indicates that the frequency and
consequence of hazards resulting from medical
device use attributed to user errors far surpass those
resulting from device failures.7 Furthermore, the FDA
suggests that user error can be reduced by the
systematic and careful design of the user interface,
i.e., the hardware and software features that define
the interaction between users and equipment.
However, the results of our study demonstrate that
the current MedWatch reporting form is inadequate
in coding user error related to the user interface. As a
result, these reports provide little feedback to help
device manufactures make safety improvements to
the user interfaces of their devices.
The NCC MERP taxonomy was designed for
reporting a medication error. It lacks robustness and
specificity for recording device errors associated with
a medication error. One useful feature of the
NCCMERP taxonomy in understanding medical
errors is that it explicitly pays attention to the role of
human factors and contributing systems factors.
However, its human factors codes are far from
sufficient to characterize the causes of user errors
reported in the MedWatch database. As noted above
only around half of the human factors causes could
be coded in the NCC MERP taxonomy, and these had
to be coded using the single code "performance
deficit." Coding the causes of user errors as a
performance deficit masks the underlying causes that
led to the deficit, making it difficult to see how to
prevent the problem from occurring again.
Analysis of the user errors from the MedWatch
database reveals several problems relating to human
and systems factors. The large number of reports in
which pumps were suspected to be malfunctioning,
but found to be functioning correctly, as well as the
large number of programming errors, indicates that
users often have difficulty understanding or using the
devices. Instead of blaming these difficulties on the
users, the manufacturers should investigate the source
of these difficulties and redesign their devices to
prevent them.
The fact that errors were attributed to the user in
devices that were not found to be malfunctioning,
along with the many reports that recommend
additional training or reading the manual, reflects a
poor understanding of how device design and the
environment in which the device is used may
contribute to user errors. Suggesting that users should
receive more training or read the manual overlooks
the fact that even well-trained individuals may make
mistakes given poor device design or certain
environmental factors (such as poor lighting or a high
workload). Whenever a device error is attributed to
the user, hospital staff and manufacturers should
determine whether the device or environmental
factors induced or contributed to the error. Sadly,
many of the reports end the analysis once user error
is determined and make no attempt to determine
whether device design or systems factors may have
contributed to the error. User training is certainly an
important component to safe medical device use, but
reducing the chances of user errors through careful
device design and environmental changes is a better
approach for improving safety while simultaneously
decreasing training time.
CONCLUSION
We evaluated a taxonomy (NCC MERP), an error
reporting system (MedWatch form), and the mapping
between them.
The NCC MERP taxonomy is comprehensive and it
is good for certain data collection and archiving
purposes. However, it is not based on a
systematicapproach, a theory of errors, or an
approach that can categorize errors not only for
archiving and statistics but also for generating
interventions of error reduction. One good feature of
NCC MERP is its explicit inclusion ofhuman factors.
However, its treatment and presentation of human
factors are far from sufficient. In our opinion, human
factors are one of the most fundamental causes of
medical errors. A systematic treatment of human
factors is essential for a useful taxonomy that has
values for interventions.
The MedWatch error reporting system is mostly
based on free text in an unstructured format. Medical
error data collected in this way are rarely useful for
the detection of patterns, discovery of underlying
factors, and generation of solutions, because user
entered free text do not contain the right types of
information needed for interventions and is difficult
to analyze in a systematic way. Medical error
reporting systems should not be merely record
keeping systems. They should be systems for the
identification of problems and generation of
solutions.
The NCC MERP taxonomy of medication errors
cannot be mapped to the structured entries of the
MedWatch form and can only be partially mapped to
the free text description with effortful hand coding of
the contents in the free text. The free text gives an
unstructured account of the medical error in the
reporter's own words but presents problems in coding
using a standard taxonomy. The NCC MERP
taxonomy is limited in coding specific details of a
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medical device error. In order to expand its utility,
the NCC MERP taxonomy should be expanded for
more detailed coding.
Partially in response to the problems with NCC
MERP taxonomy and the MedWatch reporting
system, we developed a preliminary cognitive
taxonomy'6 of medical errors that may be developed
(1) to categorize all types of errors along cognitive
dimensions, (2) to associate each type of error with a
specific underlying cognitive mechanism, (3) to
explain why, and even predict when and where, a
specific error will occur, and (4) to generate
intervention strategies for each type of error. One
important practical implication of this cognitive
taxonomy is that it can provide systematic, principled
methods for the design of medical error reporting
systems that can capture information not just for
record keeping and statistics but also for the
identification of problems and generation of
solutions. We are currently developing an online
medical error reporting system that is based on the
cognitive taxonomy we have been developing. In this
system, questions and inquiries are generated to
encode cognitively relevant information; the
categorization of errors is along relevant cognitive
dimensions; and it is designed to generate immediate
recommendations on possible intervention strategies.
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